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This article is concerned with the remarkable development of tech- 
nological and economic capabilities by Korean and Taiwanese firms, 
particularly in electronics, and Indian firms in software and a few 
other fields. While the cases differ in many aspects, they all involve 
active learning, in some cases through reverse engineering, requiring 
a considerable amount to technical and economic sophistication. All 
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us a lot about the mechanisms involved in successful technological 
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I. Introduction
The very term “technology transfer” makes the process sound decep- 
tively easy. This has had the unfortunate effect, for many years, of leading 
to a neglect of the difficulties, often subtle and complex, associated with 
introducing an old technology into a context that was substantially dif- 
ferent from the economic and social context in which it originally de- 
veloped. These transfers in fact involve substantial doses of entrepre- 
neurship and therefore risk. I use the term “entrepreneurship” here in 
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order to emphasize that such transfers have been full of uncertainties. 
These uncertainties are typically ignored in current approaches by econo- 
mists of a neoclassical persuasion who treat the entire world as if every- 
one had equal access to all points on some pre-existing international 
production function. While there has indeed been a growing awareness, 
in recent years, of the difficulties attached to such an approach, it is 
also true that many of the technologies that are now undergoing transfer 
are far more complicated than those that were being transferred 30 or 
40 years ago. One of the reasons for this is a very gratifying one: that 
several countries, mainly in east and southeast Asia, have achieved 
considerable success in industrial development and have thus moved 
well up on the scale of technological sophistication.
These remarks already call attention to the dangers of sweeping gen- 
eralizations. In discussing technology transfer it is essential to under- 
stand that technologies are enormously diverse from one sector of the 
economy to another, and changes in the patterns of industrial organiza- 
tion, including particularly changes in the division of labor among firms, 
may open up opportunities that did not previously exist. Indeed, the 
possibility of new economic opportunities thrown up by new interna- 
tional divisions of labor will be one of my central concerns. But the 
overriding concern of my paper is to enlarge the framework within which 
we think about technology transfer. Most especially, I am trying to iden- 
tify new doorways through which LDCs (late developing countries) can 
obtain access to the benefits that can be made to flow from new tech- 
nologies.
I intend to focus on 3 countries that have had distinctly different ex- 
periences with the introduction of new technologies into their economies. 
Some of the contrasts between South Korea and Taiwan, on the one 
hand, and India on the other, are surely blatantly obvious. But it should 
also be said, at the outset, that although Korea and Taiwan have been 
outstanding success stories, some of their successes have been attained 
by travelling along distinctly different paths from one another. With 
respect to India, I have been driven by 2 very different concerns. First 
of all, India’s huge size simply commands attention. The population of 
India passed the one billion mark not long ago; indeed, India has two 
states (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) each of whose populations vastly 
exceed the combined populations of Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, a 
distressingly large percentage of the world’s poorest people live in India. 
But, secondly, recent experiences on the Indian subcontinent suggest 
that the country may be in a position to make much more extensive 
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utilization of technologies ― technologies that may not be new to the 
world, but may hold out great promise in the changing Indian context.
II. Korea and Taiwan
A useful perspective for analyzing the poor performance of many less- 
developed economies is to say that their efforts to accelerate the tech- 
nological learning process have suffered from an excessive preoccupa- 
tion with the manipulation of supply side variables. This was very ob- 
viously the case in establishing and financing public agencies that were 
expected to provide the country with research and development findings 
of economic value. Moreover, given the genuine weakness of incentives 
for private firms to undertake research, as well as the ideological glamour 
that was once attached to central planning and the control over the 
“commanding heights” of the economy in the years of decolonization, it 
seemed natural for governments to place such research in the public 
sector. Far less attention was devoted to policies that might have ex- 
pressed themselves by working via demand side variables, by streng- 
thening the incentives of profit-seeking firms to upgrade their own tech- 
nological-learning activities.
Against this background, a strategic feature of the successful east 
Asian economies, most especially Korea and Taiwan, is that they adopted 
policies that powerfully strengthened the demand side of the equation. 
I am not, of course, suggesting that Korea and Taiwan ignored the supply 
side ― far from it ― but rather that they also devoted much greater 
attention to policies that had large impacts on the demand side. As is 
well known, Korea and Taiwan introduced policies that strongly rewarded 
an export orientation and an eventual shifting from lower-value-added 
to higher-value-added products. Pursuit of these overlapping objectives 
at the level of the individual firm inevitably required an expanded com- 
mitment to internal technological learning ― i.e., internal to the firm. 
In effect, the strong export-oriented policies of Korea and Taiwan pro- 
vided a powerful feedback mechanism, emanating from the demand side 
and impinging directly upon profit-making firms. It must be stressed 
that it is at the level of the individual firm that the new technological 
capabilities must be mastered ― at least in the cases of the electronic 
and mechanical products that loomed so large in the exports of Korea 
and Taiwan. Producing for more affluent overseas markets required 
growing commitments to improvements in manufacturing technologies 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS286
and, later, to more formalized R&D investments in order to master (and 
in some cases to eventually improve upon) the imported technologies 
that were essential in catering to the demand of those overseas markets 
for sophisticated consumer goods.
Not only were Korea and Taiwan highly successful, but it is important 
to note that their remarkable economic achievements were built upon 
strikingly different industrial structures ― a handful of huge chaebols 
in the Korean case and a vast expanse of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the Taiwanese case. Nevertheless, their export-oriented 
and higher-value-added policies served, in both cases, to powerfully 
raise the demand for technological learning inside the firm. The pre- 
dominance of large-scale conglomerates in Korean industry was central 
to that country’s spectacular growth in private sector spending on R&D. 
In the middle of the 1970s, Korean R&D spending amounted to a mere 
0.5 percent of GNP, a share roughly comparable at the time to Brazil, 
Mexico and India. Moreover, 80 percent of Korea’s R&D budgets in the 
1970s were publicly financed, and most of the R&D was actually per- 
formed in government laboratories. By 1990, however, there had taken 
place a five-fold increase in the share of R&D in GNP, and the share 
that was financed by government had fallen to 20 percent (Dahlman 
and Nelson 1993). Here again, however, the Taiwanese case offers a 
sharp contrast with the situation in Korea. More than half of Taiwan’s 
R&D expenditures in the early 1990s were provided by the government, 
reflecting an economy dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Taiwan had established a government-financed Industrial Technology 
Research Institute (ITRI), which certainly made contributions to tech- 
nology transfer in specific categories. But Hobday, and others, have 
concluded that it was primarily the entrepreneurial initiatives, and the 
ability of small and medium-sized firms to improve upon foreign tech- 
nology, that accounted for Taiwan’s impressive economic achievements 
in the electronics sector (Hobday 1995)
Much of the economic literature on Korea and Taiwan has focused 
upon their respective achievements in mastering sophisticated electronics 
technologies. Their accomplishments within this realm have indeed 
been most impressive. In the Korean case, Samsung Electronics has 
become the world’s largest producer of memory chips; in recent years, 
Korea has been ranked first or second in the world as a producer of 
cellular phones; and most recently it has laid claim to world leadership 
in the development of wireless Internet services. But beside these achieve- 
ments at the technological frontier, Korea now has the largest ship- 
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building industry in the world and is also home to the world’s largest 
facility for the production of iron and steel ― Pohang Iron and Steel 
Ltd. (POSCO). Korea is also now the third largest producer of iron and 
steel in the world. Clearly, these are only indirect measures of tech- 
nological performance that may not directly translate into measures of 
economic performance if, for example, such firms have simply remained 
heavily dependent upon government subsidies. This, however, has not 
been the case. But my primary concern at present is with the transfer 
of technological capabilities, and with respect to that criterion these 
rankings are, I believe, most revealing. For the record, however, World 
Bank data on per capita gross national income (GNI) [$US, PPP] show 
Korea approaching European standards at $17,340 for the year 2000. 
Comparable figures for other countries are as follows (World Bank 
2002): China, $3940; Russia, $8030; Japan, $26460; US, $34260.
The Taiwanese case has been especially impressive because, among 
other things, it challenges a widely-held view that export growth in elec- 
tronics and elsewhere necessarily required firms that operated on a large 
scale. But in fact, as Hobday has observed, “... in consumer electronics, 
computing, clothing, footware, bicycles and other important export sectors 
small firms in Taiwan matched or exceeded the performance of the 
chaebol in export value” (Hobday 1995). Taiwan’s predominantly small 
firms possessed an impressive capacity to change direction and to re- 
spond quickly to altered specifications, a capability that was of great 
commercial value in industrial sectors that experienced rapid techno- 
logical changes or sudden alterations in consumer preferences.
In fact, in spite of the chaebol successes in organizing many of its 
modernization efforts, it may be argued that Korea’s heavy reliance on 
large firms was not an unqualified success. Whereas the chaebols im- 
proved their manufacturing and design capabilities by drawing on foreign 
sources, Korea’s dynamic small firms, at least in the early stages of its 
industrial development, achieved similar goals through the reverse en- 
gineering of foreign technologies and other measures internal to the 
firm, as well as through a more extensive reliance on local Korean 
universities. A central strategy of these firms was to reverse engineer, 
so much so that Linsu Kim has concluded: “The Korean experience in- 
dicates that most of the information required to solve technical problems 
in the early years of industrialization can be obtained free of charge 
through non-market-mediated informal mechanisms if catching-up firms 
have the local ability to undertake reverse engineering tasks” (Kim 1997). 
In the later stages of its rapid industrial development, Korea relied heavily 
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upon the purchasing and licensing of capital goods from abroad. Ad- 
ditionally, as Enos and Park have observed., “... Korea has not relied 
upon direct foreign investment as a source of foreign technologie” (Enos 
and Park 1998).1
When placed within the matrix of international trade, the early growth 
of the east Asian industrial firms has to be understood in terms of their 
ability to respond to the demand-pull provided by multinational firms. 
These multinationals welcomed the low cost versions of products, or 
labor inputs, that Asian firms were able to supply. Thus, the east Asian 
industrial firm was confronted with a potentially vastly enlarged demand 
for products or components that could be delivered cheaply, by global 
standards, and that required no search or research devoted to product 
innovation. The product already existed, having been innovated abroad. 
However, knowledge of how best to produce these products did not yet 
exist within the firms. In these cases, a successful strategy for acquiring 
this knowledge involved tapping the skills of trained engineers and tech- 
nicians to reverse engineer the product. These are activities associated 
with the creation of “internally-new” knowledge, but knowledge that was 
not new to the world. Without minimizing an array of difficulties in 
“learning to imitate,” or “learning to learn,” many of which are not readily 
classifiable within the usual subcategories or R&D in OECD countries, 
what was required was, mainly, the skills of trained engineers and tech- 
nicians. Engineers and technicians in east Asian firms, then, were able 
to gain initial entry into world markets by devising new process tech- 
nologies, or making other adaptations, that would allow their firms to 
become suppliers to large multinational firms that sold their products 
in more affluent world markets (Patel and Pavitt 1994).2
1 Enos and Park (1998) provides a careful, technologically-sophisticated exam- 
ination of Korea’s technology transfer experiences in petrochemicals, synthetic 
fibres, machinery and iron and steel. The authors regard “lower costs of acqui- 
sition and speedier transmission of know-how” as “the two main accomplish- 
ments of the Koreans in their negotiations with foreign suppliers of technology,” 
whereas they regard the Koreans as having been least successful “in the next 
stage of the process of incorporating foreign technologies ― learning how to 
design facilities and the constituent equipment.”
2 Patel and Pavitt (1994) argue for the continuing pervasive importance of 
mechanical engineering capabilities in spite of the growth of highly visible, 
science-based technologies in the realms of the chemical and electrical indus- 
tries. “Science-based technologies are those that in general are growing most 
rapidly and they are dominated by large firms, but this is only part (about a 
half) of the story. Nearly 40% is made up of improvements in mechanical 
instrumentation and process technologies, development of which is hidden in 
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Hence, one key reason why the concept of R&D is of only limited use 
in the present context is precisely because the process of technology 
transfer in the east Asian case involved recourse to a diversity of organ- 
izational arrangements, some of them new, some of them old but utilized 
on a much larger scale. For the countries that could make the transition, 
their firms were able to enter world markets through the new divisions 
of labor that were made possible by these mechanisms. These arrange- 
ments included subcontracting, original equipment manufacture (OEM), 
purchase of foreign capital goods, reverse engineering, joint ventures, 
foreign direct investment, licensing of patented technologies, as well as 
overseas training and the return of nationals with overseas education 
or experience, etc. (Hobday 2000).3
As east Asia entered into new relationships with overseas firms (sub- 
contractor, OEM, FDI), the technological learning achieved by the ldc 
firms came to be shaped increasingly by feedbacks from the design, 
distribution and marketing stages of foreign firms in the industrial world, 
rather than from feedbacks originating in the marketing and distribution 
activities of their own domestic markets. These feedbacks included meet- 
ing higher standards of quality and performance, introducing drastic 
changes in design to accommodate different tastes, or niche markets, 
frequent changes in the composition of demand in affluent markets, as 
well as different tradeoffs between quality and cost. In terms of the 
primary activities involved, a common pattern was movement upward 
from the supplying of labor-intensive assembly services to the eventual 
export of more sophisticated final products, especially electronic products, 
to foreign markets (Kim 1997).4
There is an important point to be made here that is usually over- 
looked. That is, as east Asian firms became increasingly dependent upon 
multinational firms for their marketing and distribution services, these 
same multinationals, ipso facto, acquired strong financial incentives to 
the published data on large companies’ R&D activities and dispersed amongst 
small firms whose technological activities are only very imperfectly and incom- 
pletely recorded.”
3 Hobday has defined the OEM system as follows: “OEM is a specific form of 
subcontracting that evolved out of the joint operations of TNC buyers and NIE 
suppliers. Under OEM, the finished product is made to the precise specification 
of a particular buyer (or TNC) who then markets the product under its own 
brand name, through its own distribution channels.”
4 Linsu Kim has documented the global efforts of Korean chaebol to monitor 
research in advanced countries at the technological frontiers by purchasing 
firms and setting up subsidiaries abroad.
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improve the technological capabilities of their east Asian suppliers. 
Obviously, the multinationals were not anxious to create new overseas 
competitors, and this concern was often a source of considerable fric- 
tion ― for example, when ldc suppliers attempted to move up to the 
higher product quality ranges and, eventually, to introduce their own 
brand names. Nevertheless, when a Korean or Taiwanese firm acted as 
a supplier of products or components that were destined to be sold 
under a well-known overseas brand name or distribution channel, the 
multinational inevitably acquired an incentive to assure that its supplier 
firm met minimal standards of quality, performance and cost and, not 
least, delivered the inputs within an agreed-upon time schedule. These 
were, by no means, trivial things to learn. 
By the late 1980s the OEM relationship accounted, by one estimate, 
for 60 to 70 percent of Korea’s total electronics exports a sector do- 
minated by the large chaebols (Jun and Kim 1990) In Taiwan, under 
organizational arrangements that were drastically different from those 
that prevailed in Korea, hundreds of small electronics firms emerged 
under various kinds of sub-contracting and OEM arrangements. Taiwan’s 
electronics firms derived huge economic benefits from these arrangements. 
As Hobday has observed: “Under the early OEM deals, the foreign cor- 
porations frequently supplied training, technical specifications and advice 
on engineering and capital goods. The OEM system proved an enduring 
technological training school for latecomers in the NIEs, enabling hun- 
dreds of small firms to overcome barriers to entry. By the early 1990s 
a significant proportion of electronics output was still sold under OEM 
and similar sub-contracting arrangements” (Hobday 1995). The OEM, in 
its various forms, unquestionably deserves to be regarded as an organi- 
zational innovation of major importance.
By 1993, Taiwan was a major player in the world computer market, 
dominating that market for a number of component products. These 
included: 83% of the world market share of motherboards; 51% of the 
monitors, 55% of image scanners, 80% of the mouses, and 49% of the 
keyboards (Pack 2000). The small Taiwanese firms possessed none of 
the benefits of scale or huge financial resources that eventually accrued 
to the Korean chaebols; nevertheless, they exhibited formidable entre- 
preneurial skills including, most especially, the ability to carefully ana- 
lyze trends in specialized niche markets and to mobilize rapid responses 
to these emerging opportunities, often in the face of very high levels of 
risk. In many cases, as suggested by the numbers just cited, the niches 
sometimes proved to be capable of almost indefinite enlargement.
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This has been a considerable accomplishment in view of the inherent 
features of some of these high tech markets where there are rapid 
changes in product specification. As Howard Pack has observed: “... it is 
precisely in high-tech areas that it is very difficult to achieve a self- 
sustaining niche in world markets ... There are few high-income elasticity 
markets with static unchanging demands for standardized commodities 
such as steel and television sets. Rather, many of the markets with 
high-income elasticity change with extraordinary rapidity, and their 
evolution, even over six months, is often unpredictable (2000).”
The Korean and Taiwanese achievements were based on extreme dif- 
ferences in industrial organization and structure, and relied on a variety 
of organizational channels through which each was able to acquire new 
skills at progressively higher levels of technological sophistication. Much 
of the learning, it should be emphasized, was organizational and man- 
agerial, including especially the acquisition of specific knowledge and 
skills that were essential in selling products in overseas markets. The 
access to knowledge concerning the determinants of demand side forces 
in these affluent overseas markets provided, in turn, indispensable feed- 
backs that shaped the technological learning processes in east Asia. 
The essential point about such feedbacks is that they provide guidance 
to technological improvements and design change. In the industrial 
sectors in which Korea and Taiwan competed in international markets 
(i.e., in the electronics and mechanical sectors), feedbacks are the es- 
sential aspect of learning, as opposed to, say, the chemical and phar- 
maceutical sectors, where such feedbacks have been far less influential. 
Of course, the very success of the technology transfer process on the 
part of an late developing countries (LDC) was also likely to encounter 
certain inherent limitations. As the LDC firms moved up the ladder of 
technological sophistication, rising wages reduced the economic attract- 
iveness of the country as a source of relatively cheap labor. Indeed, for 
the last couple decades a conspicuous major trend in east Asia has 
been the continuous shifting of the outsourcing activities of Japanese 
and American multinational firms to other Asian countries in which 
labor markets have not yet been visited by the rising wages generated 
by technology transfer mechanisms.
It is interesting to note that the successful tigers in east Asia are 
already extensively committed to the transfer of productive activities to 
neighboring countries where labor costs are still very low. The current 
favorite is, of course, China, and China’s status in this respect is likely 
to continue for a long time. The London Economist has reported that 
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more than half of Taiwan’s production of information technologies has 
already been moved to the Chinese mainland, and it adds, succinctly: 
“Acer, Taiwan’s best-known computer brand, looks increasingly like a 
mainland company with a head office in Taipei.”5 (Economist 2000)
There has also been another, opposite side to this coin of successful 
technology transfer. Although the marketing, distribution and design 
capabilities of multinational firms provided the portals through which 
Korean and Taiwanese firms entered into new international markets, 
the mutually-beneficial nature of these relationships eventually encoun- 
tered certain limits. These limits were likely to be encountered when 
LDC firms wished to move out of the shadows as invisible suppliers of 
components or finished products, in order to establish their own identity 
with their own brand names, products and distribution systems ― thus 
becoming a competitor rather than a supplier to the multinational firm. 
In the bicycle markets of America and Europe, for example, which have 
been absorbing massive imports of Asian products, Asian manufacturers 
who are searching for greater brand name awareness have discovered 
that the fastest way to achieve such awareness may be simply to pur- 
chase (often moribund) western bicycle firms in order to exploit their 
names as well as their distribution networks.6
Korea eventually introduced another organizational mechanism that 
has played a role of increasing significance in acquiring advanced tech- 
nological knowledge; It has established R&D facilities in the US ― of 
which it had no less than 32 by 1996, including 10 in semiconductors 
and 7 in computers (National Science Board 1998).
III. India 
So far our examination of technology transfer has drawn primarily on 
the experiences of two countries that have been highly successful at 
this activity. It may now be useful to ask whether some additional in- 
sights can be drawn from the experiences of a country that has had 
very different background conditions and that, until recently, has had a 
dismally poor record in introducing new technologies, most particularly 
when measured against the high achievers, Korea and Taiwan. Some 
recent Indian experiences raise intriguing possibilities concerning the 
potential role of innovations ― both technological and organizational ― 
5 From a report in Economist Magazine in page 59 of the April 27 2000 issue.
6 From a report in Economist Magazine in page 62 of the June 1 2002 issue.
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in the country’s future. What are the opportunities that might lie ahead?
It is not necessary to rehearse the broad contours of the Indian 
situation in any detail. For forty years or so after its independence the 
Indian economy was dominated by a dedication to a policy of autarky, 
with an industrial sector solidly protected against the competition of 
imports, and an overall economic policy whose primary concern was 
with ensuring national self-sufficiency. In its most extreme formulation, 
one needs only to recall Nehru’s extraordinary dictum that “It is better 
to have a second-rate thing made in one’s own country than a first-rate 
thing one has to import.” Key features were extensive government re- 
gulation, dominated by requirements that firms seek permission, usually 
in the form of a license issued by the government bureaucracy, for a 
bewildering array of what would, in more market-oriented economies, 
be regarded as normal, prosaic, day-to-day business transactions. The 
central figure in all this was the notorious “license raj.” Moreover, a 
very large swath of economic activity fell within the public sphere in- 
cluding, notably for our present purposes, the quite substantial resources 
committed to scientific and technological research. Many sectors of the 
economy were reserved for small-scale firms by such simple expedients 
as legal restrictions on the freedom of firms to expand their share of 
domestic markets (Kim and Nelson 2000).7 Clearly, the regulatory regime 
under which the Indian economy suppressed competitive forces for several 
decades was an environment that also suppressed the incentives for 
technological change.8
In 1991 a policy of extensive liberalization was introduced, which in- 
cluded a sharp reduction in a variety of licensing controls and a general 
7 In some cases, at least, the Indian government actually discouraged com- 
petitive efforts that would lead to changes in the share of Indian firms in the 
domestic market. In discussing the textile industry, Pack has observed: “Until 
the reforms of 1991, individual firms faced legal restrictions on their ability to 
expand their share of the domestic market. Simultaneously, the foreign trade 
regime discouraged exports. Thus, even with superb researchers and excellent 
institutional structure, there was no payoff to either education or R&D in the 
Indian textile sector.”
8 DeLong (2001) asserts, using IMF data, that India experienced an acceler- 
ation of annual real GDP growth, and annual real GDP growth per capita, 
during the 1980s. Although India’s rate of growth continued to accelerate during 
the 1990s, that acceleration was nowhere nearly as great as the acceleration of 
the previous decade. De Long observes further that “... Since the late 1980s 
India ... has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.” He identi- 
fies India’s true turning point as 1984, pegging it to a liberalization movement 
that was started in that year under Rajiv Gandhi.
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opening up of a previously largely closed economy, involving especially 
a lifting of some import restrictions on capital goods and foreign invest- 
ment and a decline in the (still large) public sector. The effects of these 
relaxations are still reverberating through the economy, but what is 
already clear is that many sectors have been exposed, for the first time, 
to competitive forces, especially competition from abroad. In the most 
general sense, the existence of increased competition called into play an 
active search for better technologies ― not necessarily new technologies 
― that could enhance a firm’s market position vis-a-vis existing or po- 
tential competitors. These competitive forces impacted upon the intro- 
duction of new technologies in various ways. Obviously, foreign firms 
could now enter Indian markets far more freely than was previously 
possible, bringing with them new consumer products, along with capital 
goods, that were previously excluded from entry. Indian manufacturers 
of a wide range of products, from automobiles to tooth brushes, found 
themselves shaken out of a long period of somnolence during which 
they had been able to sell products to the Indian middle classes that 
would have been regarded as hilariously obsolete in most other coun- 
tries of the world. And, not least, India’s pool of potential entrepreneurs 
discovered that, with access to foreign technologies that were not pre- 
viously importable, they could now enter and possibly compete succes- 
sfully in delivering services and goods, not only to Indian markets, but 
also to overseas markets ― something they had not previously con- 
sidered as even remotely possible (Forbes 2000).
I wish to call attention to some striking developments in the country’s 
acquisition of new technological capabilities, which are deserving of fur- 
ther examination. The first one, India’s entry into the world market as 
a major exporter of software, is by now well-known, although some 
possible implications of that entry need further consideration. The second, 
India’s acquisition of a large domestic capability in the technologically- 
sophisticated realm of chemical process plants, is not widely-known, 
but deserves to be. I will deal with the latter case first.
It is worth pointing out, to begin with, that the share of non-industrial 
countries in the total world production and export of chemicals has 
increased drastically since the 1950s. Eichengreen (1998) shows that 
industrial countries accounted for 86 percent of world chemical produc- 
tion in 1954 and 62 percent in 1994. But the increase in the share of 
the non-industrial countries in world exports was spectacular: Those 
countries accounted for a trivial 0.2 percent of chemical exports in 1959 
but fully one-third (33.4 percent) in 1993. For the specific case of India, 
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much of its growth was in the intermediate goods sectors. In the second 
half of the 1990s its chemical sector was growing at the rapid annual 
rate of 10 percent, while its high tech petrochemical sector was growing 
at an annual rate of between 15 and 20 percent. India’s overall indus- 
trial growth rate was 8 percent (Eichengreen 1998).9
A strategic consideration for India’s future (as well as for other ldcs) 
is that there now exists a more extensive division of labor within the 
world chemical industry. This involves the activities of specialized en- 
gineering firms, as well as other sellers of chemical technologies, that 
may facilitate many of the critical aspects of technology transfers in 
chemicals to a less developed economy. For example, LDCs can now 
contract with specialized engineering firms to design and to install a 
chemical process plant with specified output capabilities. These are skills 
that are, typically, very difficult, and very expensive, to generate inter- 
nally in LDCs, but in the presence of a well-functioning market for tech- 
nology design and engineering services, this may now be unnecessary 
(Arora, Fisfuri and A. Gambardella 2001).
Thus, the turnkey plant, long derided in the development literature, 
has become more feasible, although the feasibility remains subject to 
certain qualifications. The recipient firm is not absolved of all responsi- 
bility in the sense that the term “turnkey plant” might suggest. The re- 
cipient firm must have, or at least must be able to develop, some in- 
house capability to “trouble-shoot” and to perform maintenance and re- 
pair work, which will involve periodically bringing the operation of the 
plant to a halt and later starting it up again. Here too, the specialized 
engineering firm can be contracted with to “de-bottleneck” the plant, if 
necessary. However, if these capabilities are not quickly achieved by the 
recipient, prospects for future commercial viability of the plant will re- 
main distinctly poor. An important inference from the recent Indian ex- 
perience, however, is that entry into certain higher technology sectors of 
economic activity has become, at the least, very much cheaper than 
before.
These observations raise some profoundly important questions: will 
the new division of labor in world markets now permit firms in certain 
sectors of LDCs to move up the ladder of technological sophistication 
with a smaller “endowment” of their own technological capabilities than 
was previously the case? How much smaller? And which specific sectors? 
9 Mani (2002, Chapter 7) reports that “very nearly 70% of India’s high-tech 
exports is composed of pharmaceutical and inorganic chemical products.”
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS296
I will have something to say about chemical processing plants ― a sector 
of huge importance ― but I am really most interested in the more 
generic issue: are new international divisions of labor reducing the level 
of technological skills that once had to exist in the recipient LDC firms 
in order to achieve a successful transfer of technology? Clearly, some 
minimal technological capabilities must reside inside the industrial firm, 
but recent experience also suggests that the ability to manage the con- 
tracting firms that will design and install the new technologies, will often 
be a crucial skill. Does the experience of the chemical industry suggest 
that there are further new opportunities that have been emerging in world 
markets, along with new international divisions of labor, the future sig- 
nificance of which is far from being fully appreciated? What other vari- 
ables shape these possibilities? In particular, to what extent can improved 
managerial skills serve as a substitute for limited technological skills in 
facilitating technology transfers? In the Indian context, is it the case 
that there is such a thing as a core competence in large project man- 
agement expertise? Some recent experience in India suggests that this 
competence may be real.
Consider the experience of Reliance Industries Ltd. Reliance is a very 
large Indian firm that had its origins in the textile industry and then 
integrated “upstream” into intermediates (purified terephthalic acid for 
polyesters), and then into refining and the production of feed stocks. 
Reliance engaged several large contracting firms, including Bechtel and 
Stone and Webster, from whom they also licensed technologies, who 
successfully built the world’s largest “grassroots” refinery and down- 
stream plants, in Gujarat. This facility, which came on line six months 
ahead of schedule, costing $US 6 billion, now accounts for 25 percent 
of India’s refining capacity.10 But it is important to add that this firm, 
which had never set up a refinery, and which had only limited tech- 
nological skills, also demonstrated a considerable managerial sophisti- 
cation. This sophistication applied, not only with respect to the man- 
10 Reliance also employed about 2000 of its own engineers who worked along- 
side the Bechtel engineers. These engineers learned from Bechtel, who were then 
enabled, later on, to take greater responsibility for an expansion that was launched 
while the first phase of the project was being completed. Reliance has recently 
moved in the direction of becoming a conglomerate, as a result of its entry into 
power, telecommunications, IT, insurance and biotechnology. It should also be 
noted that Reliance’s expansion into petrochemical products such as polyesters, 
polyester intermediates and plastics has been facilitated by high levels of import 
duties on such products.
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agement of several large contractors, but also in entering into a number 
of complex contractual relationships that stabilized the reliability of its 
crude oil procurement and thereby insulated the firm from a number of 
the other, unavoidable vagaries of the oil business. These were con- 
siderable achievements. It should be noted that Reliance appears also 
to have had considerable political influence.
The Reliance experience, of entering the oil refinery business with no 
capacity for either designing or constructing such a facility, suggests 
that much technology may now be acquired through the marketplace by 
firms that have the appropriate, in-house managerial skills, but not the 
in-house capability to design and construct a large refinery. But this 
encouraging possibility, in turn, calls attention to issues that require 
further exploration at the sectoral level.
After all, in all advanced industrial economies there have long existed 
capital goods firms that design and manufacture capital equipment that 
could not be designed or manufactured by the eventual users of such 
equipment. In this sense, Reliance’s dependence upon a number of spe- 
cialized contractors is hardly unique. But why, then, should Reliance’s 
accomplishments in refining be treated as so remarkable in the Indian 
case? An answer that readily suggests itself is that the managerial ex- 
pertise of the kind that was exercised by Reliance remains very scarce, 
not only on the Indian subcontinent, but in much of the less-developed 
world as well. But of course the possibility exists that the apparent 
scarcity of managerial and entrepreneurial skills may, in turn, simply 
be a reflection of an over-regulated economy where such potential talents 
have, in the past, been deflected into rent-seeking activities.
In the case of the rising share of the LDCs in the chemical industry, 
conditioning factors in the past half century were the growth in demand, 
the decline in transportation costs, and better access to sources of raw 
materials. Underlying the growth in demand, in turn, was the huge 
growth in the petrochemical industries after the Second World War, a 
growth that required a vastly enlarged capacity for the production of 
the intermediate inputs for plastics, synthetic fibres, etc. A powerful 
facilitating factor in the less-developed world after 1970, when chemical 
processing plants (including, of course, oil refineries) began to become 
important outside of the industrial world, was the specialized engineering 
firms (a specialization that was largely of American origin) that had al- 
ready come to play a major role in the diffusion of chemical processing 
plants in industrial countries. Many SEFs provide construction services 
and have therefore served as providers of “turnkey plants.” They have 
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also often served as licensing agents for chemical firms and, by inducing 
these firms to license their technologies, they have speeded up the pro- 
cess of diffusion and have helped to create, in effect, a market for tech- 
nology. 
As Arora et al. (2001) have shown in their valuable and extensive 
study, in the decade of the 1980s SEFs accounted for nearly three 
quarters of world construction of chemical processing plants. Going 
back to the years immediately after the Second World War, these SEFs, 
through long cumulative learning and experience, acquired a comparative 
advantage in the delivery of chemical engineering services. Competition 
among these SEFs for First World markets brought about substantial 
cost red`uctions leading, in turn, to lower technology transfer costs for 
markets in less-developed countries. It is at least a plausible conjecture 
that the expansion of ldcs in the production and export of chemicals 
since the 1950s, to which Eichengreen has called our attention, was 
heavily shaped by the increasing competitiveness and cost reductions in 
which the SEFs played such a significant role.
As Arora et al. (2001) have argued, this new international division of 
labor, generated initially in the First World, brought with it a substan- 
tial reduction in the cost of chemical processing plants in the Third 
World. “Simply put, the growth of the chemical industry in the first 
world created an upstream sector, which later spurred the growth of 
the chemical industry in the developing countries” (Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella 2001). I do not wish to prejudge the extent of the effec- 
tiveness of similar market mechanisms in achieving technology transfers 
elsewhere. I do, however, suggest that a high priority ought to be at- 
tached to an exploration of the changes in organizational and regula- 
tory mechanisms that might lead to further improvements in the effec- 
tiveness of markets for technology (Arora and Gambardella 1998).
I turn now to a very different sector. One of the most remarkable 
technological transfers in post-independence India (or, for that matter, 
in the entire LDC world) has been the sudden efflorescence of the com- 
puter software industry in the past two decades. The Indian software 
industry achieved annual growth rates of almost 50 percent during the 
1990s. India’s software exports reached $6 billion in the year ending 
March 2001, compared to just $150 million a decade earlier11 (New York 
Times 2002).
11 See A. Arora, R. Landau and N. Rosenberg (1998). 13 14 From a report in 
New York Times (section C3, 18 March, 2002).
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According to one estimate, India in the mid-90s accounted for 16 
percent of the world market in customized software, and 185 of the 
Fortune 500 firms have engaged in outsourcing to India (Arora et al. 
1998). India’s rising share of world trade during the 1990s, after four 
decades of decline, owed much to the spectacular performance of the 
country’s software sector ― admittedly in large part because India had 
long been such a feeble exporter. It is also important to emphasize that 
India’s software achievements could hardly have been realized had the 
country’s software firms been required to rely upon domestically-produced 
computers and software tools. India’s unexpected but welcome achieve- 
ments owed very much to the sharp decline in transmission costs that 
flowed from major innovations overseas in the realm of information and 
communication technologies.
One of the distinctive features of this sudden emergence, most unusual, 
perhaps even unprecedented, in the Indian context, is that it was an 
export-driven phenomenon ― a phenomenon based on low-value-added 
services combined with the transfer of recently-developed ICTs. It was 
driven by the export demand for the products of the computer software 
capabilities that were made possible by India’s abundance of low wage, 
English-speaking workers (Software development is still highly labor- 
intensive). Additionally, and less obviously, it owed something to a size- 
able phalanx of talented Indians who “exported” their software develop- 
ment and programming skills by migrating overseas, mostly to the US. 
A number of these migrants eventually returned to India where they 
contributed not only their technological skills, but also their entrepre- 
neurial/managerial and organizational skills, some of which were ac- 
quired, or at least “polished” abroad, to the further growth of the Indian 
software industry (Saxenian 1999).12 But the significance of “returning 
immigrants” to the Indian software industry appears to have been far 
less influential than was the case for Taiwan. The Indian diaspora 
played a far more important role as, in effect, brokers who helped to 
establish connections, in the US and UK, between clients (typically in 
12 Saxenian found in her interviews that many Indian and Chinese immi- 
grants working in Silicon Valley believed that there was a form of racial dis- 
crimination, a “glass ceiling,” limiting the rise of Indian and Chinese software 
engineers into the higher echelons of management in well-established firms. 
Many Indians interviewed by Saxenian attributed their decision to engage in 
some form of entrepreneurial activity to the persistence of that belief. At the 
same time, Saxenian cites income data that fail to provide support for the 
existence of a glass ceiling.
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large firms) and vendors (typically Indian software services suppliers).
The Indian software industry benefitted substantially, as did so many 
other sectors of the economy, from the liberalisation changes that took 
place in 1991. But the establishment of Software Technology Parks in 
the late 1980s had already provided favorable tax treatment and other 
special privileges to export-oriented software firms, even before the general 
policy of liberalisation had taken place. For example, firms in the STPs 
“... were allowed to import all equipment without duty or import license, 
and 100 percent foreign ownership was permitted in exchange for a 
sizeable export obligation” (Saxenian 1999).13
India’s surprising success as a software exporter raises many ques- 
tions, the answers to which may have potentially valuable implications, 
not just for India, but for other LDCs as well. For example:
1) What have been the essential ingredients of the Indian success, 
aside from the 2 rather obvious ones: i.e., a large pool of educated 
people with excellent English language skills, plus their availabil- 
ity at salaries that are very low by international standards?
2) Closely connected, just how professionally sophisticated do the 
software people need to be in order to build this industry and, 
eventually, to provide the leadership for moving into higher-value- 
added activities?
3) In what ways will the firms need to change in order to move from 
their present status as suppliers of low-value-added services to 
suppliers of higher-value-added services?14
4) What is the best strategy for acquiring these necessary skills for 
13 The difficulties imposed by India’s heavy-handed and uninformed bureau- 
cracy in the 1980s (e.g., customs officials who didn’t understand how the satel- 
lite datalink worked) is recounted by the experiences of Radha Basu, an Indian 
immigrant to Silicon Valley who had a long career at Hewlett-Packard and who 
later spent four years in Bangalore setting up H-P’s software center there. She 
later reported in an interview that she “... could not convince Indian customs 
agents that it was possible to export software without material evidence. For five 
years she was thus forced to dump all of the H-P systems data onto tapes and 
ship them physically to customers in the United States so that they could be 
registered and recorded as exports.
14 A number of Indian software firms are currently attempting to make this 
transition. One Indian firm, Wipro, which built its earlier reputation in low- 
margin activities, is moving into several higher-margin operations, including a 
joint venture with General Electric. The firm, Wipro GE Medical Systems, is 
already an exporter of sophisticated medical equipment. Reported in Wall Street 
Journal: section A15 in 4 January 2001.
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upgrading? What, in particular, are the implications for changes 
in higher education, technical training and research?
If one compares Asian countries in terms of their supplies of en- 
gineers, presumably a critical input into the software industry, an intri- 
guing fact quickly emerges. That is, India fails to share the general Asian 
“bias” in favor of the engineering disciplines. In 1990, India was the 
only Asian country in which university enrollment in the natural sciences 
exceeded enrollment in engineering ― and it was fully 4 times larger. 
India’s ratio of enrollment of engineers to that of scientists was, by far, 
the lowest among Asian countries (Lall 2000).15
How to explain, then, how India has managed to do so well in soft- 
ware with its apparent paucity of engineering skills?16 First of all, it is 
important to keep absolute numbers in mind, and India’s population is 
many times larger than that of any Asian country other than China. 
Still, it is notable that South Korea, with a population less than 5 per- 
cent of that of India, has far more enrolled engineers (2000). Arora et 
al. argue that “... the bulk of the work is relatively non-technical and 
requires mostly logical and methodical work and a familiarity with soft- 
ware development tools and languages (Arora et al. 1998). Given the 
large number of science and arts graduates, and the widespread avail- 
ability of private training institutions, the pool of potential software de- 
velopers is much larger than merely graduates from engineering colleges 
(Arora et al. 1998). Elsewhere, Arora has stated that what the industry 
requires is “creative people familiar with software development tools... 
The simple point is that one does not need to know thermodynamics, or 
for that matter, about the details of the operating system, to develop 
business applications which will run on top of a standard platform such 
as Oracle or SAP (a German software company). Instead, one needs to 
know Oracle and SAP and be familiar with tools to develop business 
applications.” Indeed, many engineering graduates have not been taught 
even the entry-level skills required for the software industry which, in 
any case, are subject to frequent change.
Inevitably, this raises questions concerning the qualitative dimensions 
of the available labor force. India has already established itself as a 
15 Interestingly, India has long had a modest but globally competitive engin- 
eering consultancy industry.
16 And also the fact that a non-trivial percentage of India’s best software 
talent has responded to the lure of far higher salaries abroad?
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major player in the global market by drawing upon an educated, English- 
speaking labor force (the largest English-speaking, scientific labor popu- 
lation in the world) that has been available at a low wage by compari- 
son with overseas competitors. But how long can India’s recent software 
growth rates, based on exports of standard coding and programming 
services to overseas clients, continue? How far up the value-added ladder 
can the country go with its initial advantages alone? To what extent 
can India draw upon the international division of labor, thus making 
use of complementary, high-powered skills that are not available at 
home, in sufficient amounts to support such an upward climb? And 
what specific sorts of skills are necessary? Finally, it may be simplistic 
to focus purely on technical training and technology transfer when the 
crucial inputs may be organizational and managerial, as appears to be 
at least partly the case in other sectors of the economy.
A huge imponderable with respect to the future is, to what extent 
can India exploit her present advantages in computer software and tele- 
communications as a platform for new specializations in the service 
sectors? The recent convergence of several technologies ― computers, 
satellites, fiber optics and telecommunications generally ― has created 
a new set of opportunities: possible new patterns of international spe- 
cialization that are still, very probably, in the early stages of develop- 
ment. Low labor cost countries now have a number of options for, 
literally, “plugging in” to distant markets once the necessary IT infra- 
structure has become available. India, it should be emphasized, is still 
seriously under-equipped in terms of its telecommunication infrastructure 
― electric power supply, bandwidth, Internet access, and telephone.17 
China, the present location of choice for low cost manufacturing activi- 
ties, has currently begun to show a considerable interest in software ― 
lacking, of course, the linguistic advantages of India. Nevertheless, de- 
legations of officials from the Chinese Ministry of Education have begun 
to show up at Infosys Technologies, India’s best-known Information 
Technology company, reportedly asking a wide range of detailed questions 
and taking extensive notes.
Can India establish itself as a “good place” to perform certain kinds 
of R&D? At the private sector level, the Indian press has recently reported 
that Oracle has 2000 R&D employees in India, with an announced plan 
17 India has just 5.1 internet users per 10,000 inhabitants, compared to 14.5 
for Indonesia, 20.6 for the Philippines, 367.8 for Malasia and 1373 for Taiwan. 
Based on a report in Economist magazine, in p. 399 of 22 July 2000 issue. 
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to raise that number to 4000.18 The Hindu Business Line According to 
this report, what was taking place included a “perceptible drift” on the 
part of Indian software developers from their well-established focus upon 
services development and maintenance work, to an expansion in the 
outsourcing of product R&D. Perhaps significantly, these numbers were 
announced at a time of deep recession in overseas dotcom markets. 
One possible implication for longer term trends is that the resulting 
increasing tightness in R&D budgets has pointed even more forcefully 
to the competitive advantages that may be offered by India as a low 
cost center for the performance of higher-value-added R&D work as well 
as for more traditional services. There are many straws that may be 
detected, other than Oracle, in this wind: General Electric’s research 
center in Bangalore, for example, employs 1700 scientists and engineers, 
making it GE’s largest research center outside the US. Mr. Ramesh 
Emani, Chief Technology Officer of Wipro, the largest publicly-traded soft- 
ware services company in India, has reported: “In Wipro we are seeing 
a good amount of interest from product companies in the areas of con- 
sumer electronics, automotive electronics, industrial automation, medical 
electronics, etc., in addition to the traditional outsourcers in IT and 
Telecomm.” Veritas Software, a global software company with 14 storage 
centers all over the world, now has its second largest center in Pune 
(the largest is in the US), and expects to have invested $15 to 16 
million in its Pune center in calendar year 2002. The company reports 
that 20 of its patents in 2001 were filed by its Pune subsidiary19 (The 
Hindu Business Line 2002).
Closely connected is a large group of outsourcing firms (so-called 
“call centers” or “back offices”) providing more mundane but indispen- 
sable telephone and data entry services to airlines, insurance companies 
(including claims processing), car rental firms, credit card agencies, etc. 
Aside from providing information, some of which is also being shifted to 
recorded messages, backroom activities may deal with inventory man- 
agement, payrolls, billing, credit card approvals, medical transcriptions, 
etc. But India is by no means the only LDC backroom. Handwritten 
tickets issued for violations of New York City’s environmental code are 
currently typed up into a searchable data base in Accra, Ghana by 
women working under contract for Data Management Internationale for 
less than $70/month ― 3 times the Ghanain minimum wage. They are 
18 Reported in The Hindu Business Line in 19 June 2002 issue.
19 Reported in The Hindu Business Line in 19 June 2002 issue.
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then transmitted back to New York where they are stored electronically 
and subsequently used to generate payment notices.20
It would, however, be a mistake to classify backroom activity as uni- 
formly involving low skill levels. Some will involve education of the sort 
received in MBA programs; elsewhere, as in the realm of bioinformatics, 
Indian Ph.D. graduate students currently prepare overnight delivery of 
data for American biotechnology firms while the American research 
workers sleep.
At the high tech end of the spectrum, it should be noted that India 
has a considerable generic drugs industry, with a growth rate of 8 to 9 
percent per year, with recent annual sales of about $4 billion, much of 
it exported. Since it has been estimated that pharmaceutical products 
worth over $40 billion are to go off patent by 2005, Indian companies 
may be in a strong position to take some advantage of this market. 
Most of the industry’s research effort in this sector in the past has 
been to use its in-house capability to reverse engineer ways of producing 
an existing drug more cheaply (process patents are allowed in India). 
These new processing techniques, involving the ability to produce low 
cost intermediates for the pharmaceutical industry, have then been sold 
to American pharmaceutical firms. It has been such arrangements that 
the Financial Times presumably had in mind when it characterized the 
Indian drug industry as “copy a drug and then produce it 70-80 percent 
cheaper” (8 June 2002). While this may well be an accurate description, 
efforts at large cost reductions of pharmaceutical products in an extreme- 
ly poor country hardly deserve to be treated with such ill-concealed dis- 
dain. The parallels should also be noted with India’s software industry: 
employing the country’s low-cost, educated human capital to produce 
products (in this case intermediate goods) for export primarily to the 
US.
In fact, there is recent evidence that the Indian pharmaceutical in- 
dustry is taking steps to move up the value-added ladder by devoting 
an increasing effort to drug discovery. Indeed, some of India’s best- 
known pharmaceutical companies such as Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories, have recently entered into licensing arrangements in which 
Indian innovations have been made available to western companies (i.e., 
“licensing out” rather than the traditional “licensing in.”). Ranbaxy has 
entered into a licensing agreement with the German firm, Schwarz 
Pharma involving a new chemical entity for the treatment of benign 
20 From a report in New York Times (section C3, 18 March, 2002).
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prostate hyperplasia (enlarged prostate, a very common, chronic condition 
in older men). Under this agreement, Schwarz Pharma obtained the 
exclusive right to develop, market and distribute the product in the US, 
Japan and Europe, while Ranbaxy retained the rights in all other 
markets. In the event that the product were to be developed successfully, 
Schwarz Pharma agreed to pay Ranbaxy $42 million over the next five 
to six years, including an “up front” payment of $6.3 million, to be fol- 
lowed by royalties on commercialization. These are substantial sums of 
money in the context of the Indian economy21 (The Hindu Business 
Line 2002).
Dr. Reddy‘s Laboratory has had more extensive connections with pro- 
minent European pharmaceutical firms. It has licensed one of its research 
molecules to Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical giant, for the treatment 
of diabetes, and another to the same firm for worldwide exclusive rights 
for the development and commercialization of an insulin sensitiser. Dr. 
Reddy’s Lab will receive up to $55 million up front and “milestone pay- 
ments for specific clinical and regulatory endpoints as well as royalties.”22 
On an earlier occasion Dr. Reddy’s licensed two of its molecules to Novo 
Nordisk. These molecules, at the time of the writing of the article pro- 
viding this information, were in the second phase of clinical trials.
Although these are obviously modest beginnings in the context of the 
immense world pharmaceutical industry, they show a competence for 
high tech R&D in which India may learn to play a prominent role, espe- 
cially given the large pool of qualified Indian scientists who are seriously 
underemployed. Furthermore, an enlarged competence in this field will 
surely strengthen the prospects for extensive participation in the future 
growth of biotechnology, an industry that is certain to experience great 
expansion in the course of the 21
st century. But there is another par- 
ticular aspect that deserves attention. That is, India’s first, tentative 
steps in the world pharmaceutical industry have drawn directly on the 
property rights attached to its pharmaceutical products. In the ongoing 
expansion of international markets for technology, intellectual property 
rights may well come to serve as a force for strengthening “licensing 
out” rather than “licensing in” for less developed economies. Such licen- 
sing out, of course, will serve to strengthen Indian incentives to expand 
investment in R&D (Arora et al. 2004).
21 Reported in The Hindu Business Line in 19 June 2002 issue.
22 Dr. Reddy’s: Right Prescription. pt http://content.icicidirect.com/ULF/ 
UploadFile 2002316153328.asp.
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Finally, not yet extensively explored (so far as I know) is the addi- 
tional potential that might be made to flow from India’s elite, higher 
education institutions. This potential refers particularly to the premier 
Indian Institutes of Technology and the Indian Institutes of Science, but 
also to the high quality of its trained scientists and engineers working 
in the country’s national laboratories ― the Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR). These labs have, in the past, maintained an 
arms length relationship with private industry, although they have re- 
cently been instructed to earn 30 to 50 percent of their operating budgets 
by playing a direct role, along with the private sector, in the commerci- 
alization of indigenously developed technologies. Some progress is being 
reported in this direction.23 This policy should certainly be applauded 
and encouraged. At the same time, India’s considerable R&D capabili- 
ties, combined with the global information networks that have been 
created by vastly improved telecommunications facilities, raise new op- 
portunities in international markets that deserve to be explored. Sadly 
there is, so far, little evidence of a growth of R&D spending on the part 
of private industry.  
IV. Closing Observations
Most of the technology transfer activities that have been discussed 
here have involved making uses of international markets, but in a var- 
iety of different and, in some respects, novel ways. These ways typically 
had the consequence of tapping new sources of demand in overseas 
markets for electronic products. In the case of the most successful new 
activities for Korea and Taiwan, entry was initially achieved through 
various kinds of contractual relationships with multinational firms. The 
23 The National Chemical Laboratory, established in 1950, has been widely 
considered to be the most distinguished of the 40 CSIR labs. According to Mani 
(2002), “the NCL is internationally known for its excellence in scientific research 
in chemistry and chemical engineering, and for its outstanding track record of 
industrial research. Approximately 50 per cent of its receipts emanate from the 
industry.” Mani points out that much of the recent improvement in the CSIR’s 
patenting record is attributable to the NCL. With respect to the Institutes of 
Indian Technology as a whole, he observes that “About 30 per cent of the gra- 
duates ... emigrate to the United States. Further information about the oper- 
ations at NCL, including extensive information concerning their patenting activity 
(e.g., their extensive patenting activity in the realm of catalysis, as measured by 
their US patents in this field) may be found at http://www.ncl-India.org/ 
aboutus/patcat.htmi.
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feedbacks flowing from these relationships were central to the growing 
technological sophistication of Korean and Taiwanese labor forces and 
to the latent entrepreneurial capabilities in both countries.  
In some important ways the Indian experience, which is much more 
recent than that of Korea and Taiwan, is far more portentious for the 
future. India’s recent experience in introducing sophisticated technologies 
in the chemical sector suggests that new patterns of international spe- 
cialization may now offer greatly expanded opportunities for technology 
transfer through market-mediated relationships. So far the most pro- 
mising developments (Reliance) have catered primarily to the growing 
needs of India’s domestic markets. However, there is no obvious reason 
why the acquisition of such new technological skills could not eventu- 
ally be directed at international markets, especially regional markets. 
India’s pharmaceutical sector has already achieved a number of modest 
successes, including in exports, and it is a field in which the country’s 
much-underutilized, scientific labor force could become part of a future 
enlarged high-tech success story. It would also be more than a little 
ironic if India’s pharmaceutical success were to be at least partially re- 
inforced by an expanding global system of protection for intellectual 
property! Finally, India’s quite unexpected achievement in the world 
software industry is now part of a vast platform on which the country 
may be able to build. The existing global network provided by information 
and communication technologies offers vast opportunities for specialized 
roles played by well-trained science graduates whose research findings 
can now, at least in principle, be instantly transferred anywhere in the 
world. This would require a continuation of India’s market-liberalizing 
policies of the 1990s and its further integration into the international 
economy. In this respect, all economic policies are also technology pol- 
icies, whether or not they are intended to be.
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